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I Comments

I

Pennsylvania's Use of the Sham Transaction
Doctrine to Plug the Intangible Holding
Company Loophole
Giuseppina M. Galloro*
I.

Introduction
"The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what would
otherwise be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law
permits, cannot be doubted." 1 This statement by the Supreme Court in
Gregory v. Helvering2 is a bedrock principle of tax law and has been the
primary motivation for taxpayers for over half a century. But what are
the consequences of this tax avoidance?
Using strategies that have evolved over the past twenty years and

* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2005; B.A. Political Science, magna cum laude, Saint Joseph's University,
2002. Member of Phi Beta Kappa. The author would like to thank her parents, Filippo
and Marianna Galloro, her sister, Felicia M. Galloro, and Timothy J. McCarthy for their
continued love, support, and encouragement. The author would like to add a special
thank you to her father for his insight and guidance throughout the comment writing
process.
1. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465,469 (1934).
2. Id.
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reached their height in the past five to seven years,3 multistate
corporations have taken advantage of loopholes hidden in state corporate
income tax statutes to avoid paying taxes on certain types of income.4
These strategies have caused a significant drop in the amount of revenue
earned by the states through corporate income taxes.5 Many states are
facing large budget deficits, 6 and this loss in revenue may be hard for
states to swallow, particularly when it seems that the only option
available to balance their budgets is to increase taxes or to slash many
social programs. 7 States have been forced to develop creative strategies
to generate much needed income 8 and have tried to develop ways to plug
these revenue-leaking loopholes.
The three most common tax avoidance strategies employed by
multistate corporations are: (1) the "nowhere income" loophole in which
the corporation will earn profits in a state that does not subject the
corporation to tax because the requisite nexus between the state and the
corporation has not been established; 9 (2) the shifting of intangible
3. Glenn R. Simpson, Diminishing Returns: A Tax Maneuver in Delaware Puts
Squeeze on States, WALL ST. J., August 9, 2002, at Al.
4. Michael Mazerov, Closing Three Common Corporate Income Tax Loopholes
Could Raise Additional Revenue for Many States, (Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities,
Washington, D.C.), available at http://www.cbpp.org/4-9-02sfp.htm (revised May 23,
2003). For example, corporations that take advantage of loopholes to avoid paying taxes
on income generated from the lease of intangibles from subsidiary corporations to parent
corporations and non-business income. Id.
5. Mazerov, supra note 4, at 1 (data supplied by U.S. Census Bureau reveals 3.9%
decrease in revenue generated by state corporate income tax in the years between 1979
and 2000 from 10.2% to 6.3% of state tax revenue); see also, 'Tax Sheltering' May Cost
States One-Third of Revenue, says MTC, 2003 TAX DAY, at http://tax.cchgroup.com (July
17, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 TAX DAY] (corporate tax sheltering may have reduced state
corporate income tax revenue by more than one third in 2001).
6. Tim Reason, Stingers: The 2004 State Tax Survey, CFO MAGAZINE, Jan. 2004,
availableat http://www.cfo.com (last modified Jan. 12, 2004).
7. Nicholas Johnson, Projected State Budget Deficits for Fiscal Year 2005
Continue to Threaten Public Services, (Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington
D.C.) available at www.cbpp.org/10-22-03sfp2.htm (last modified Dec. 22, 2003); see
also A Brief Update on State Fiscal Conditions and the Effects of Federal Policies on
State Budgets, (Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington D.C.) available at
www.cbpp.org/9-13-04sfp.htm (last modified September 13, 2004).
8. See, e.g., Edward Rendell, State Needs More Funds For School, Jobs; The State
Can 't Eliminate Its Budget Deficit With Spending Cuts Alone. It Needs to Raise New
Revenue to Stabalize its Finances, LANCASTER NEW ERA, Sept. 9, 2003, at A7
(Pennsylvania's recent attempt to generate income through the addition of slot machines
at the states many race tracks). See also, Robert Tanner,. Strapped States Raising Taxes,
Fees, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 13, 2003, C 13.
9. Before a state can tax any of a corporation's income earned in the state, the
federal government requires that the corporation must meet a threshold level of presence,
"nexus," with the state. Mazerov, supra note 4, at 3-5. The "no-where income" loophole
is used in situations where sufficient "nexus" between the corporation and the state
cannot be established. Id. In this situation, the income generated in the state is not
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property to "intangible holding companies" (IHCs); and (3) the defining
of income generated from certain types of transaction as "non-business
income."' 0 The states who have been hardest hit by these practices,
collectively referred to as "corporate tax sheltering," are California
($1.34 billion in corporate income tax collection losses), Illinois ($693
million), Texas ($607 million), and Pennsylvania ($582 million)."
Figure 1-Share of Total State Taxes Contributed by Corporate Income
Tax (1979-2000) 12
STATE
1979
1989
2000
All States

10.20%

8.80%

6.30%

California

14.50%

12.30%

7.90%

Connecticut

13.50%

16.60%

4.20%

Kansas

11. 90%

7.90%

5.60%

Massachusetts

13.40%

13.00%

8.10%

New Hampshire

24.20%

24.80%

18.40%

subject to tax by the state. Id. However, because the income is generated within a
particular state, the income is not subject to tax by any other state. Id. The income
becomes "no-where income," which is income earned within a state but is not subject to
tax by any state. Id.For a more in-depth discussion of the "no-where income" income
loophole, see Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Corporate Income from Intangibles:
Allied-Signal and Beyond, 48 TAx L. REv. 739 (Fall 1993).
10. The Supreme Court has determined that only certain types of income may be
allocated. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of NM, 458 U.S. 354 (1982). Allocable
income, referred to as "business income" is defined as income "arising from transactions
and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business." Mazerov, supra
note 4, at 7-8. Income which does not meet this definition is classified as "non-business
income" and is not subject to tax. Id. Corporations taking advantage of the "nonbusiness income" definition characterize transactions as one which does not occur in the
regular course of a trade or business. Id. Corporations have been extremely successful in
many states with this argument and have begun to treat transactions on the borderline of
the "business," "non-business" distinction as "non-business" income for which they are
not subject to tax. Id. For a more in-depth discussion of the "non-business" income
loophole see Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Corporate Income from Intangibles:
Allied-Signal and Beyond, 48 TAx L. REV. 739 (Fall 1993).
11. 2003 TAX DAY, supra note 5.
12. Mazerov, supra note 4. Figure 1 shows the decline in the percentage contributed
by corporate income tax to the total tax of a state. The ten states with the greatest decline
are displayed. Id.
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Ohio

10.90%

6.80%

3.20%

Pennsylvania

12.60%

9.20%

7.60%

South Carolina

9.20%

5.90%

3.60%

Vermont

8.90%

6.00%

3.00%

Wisconsin

10.00%

7.000%

4.60%

This comment will focus on the IHC loophole and the attempts
made by different states to close this loophole. Specific attention will be
paid to the strategy proposed by the Pennsylvania Legislature to recoup
income lost through the creation and use of IHCs and the relative
effectiveness of this strategy. Part II discusses the IHC loophole and
how corporations subject to Pennsylvania taxes structure their
transactions in order to take advantage of the loophole. Part III examines
the federally created sham transaction doctrine and the states' use of this
doctrine to recoup income lost due to the IHC loophole. Part IV
discusses the Pennsylvania Legislature's attempt to close the IHC
loophole through the codification of the sham transaction doctrine
proposed in House Bill 1305. Part V analyzes the effectiveness of the
proposed legislation.
II.

IHCs and the Leasing of Intangible Property

Pennsylvania has the highest corporate tax rate in the nation, taxing
corporations at a rate of 9.99%.13 Yet, Pennsylvania is fourth in the
nation at estimated losses from corporate tax collections.1 4 This loss in
revenue is partly attributable to an aggressive tax strategy employed by
multistate corporations that conduct business and are taxed in
Pennsylvania.15 The strategy allows corporations to reduce their income
for expenses the corporation incurs when it pays for the use of intangible
property. 16 There is some discrepancy as to the exact amount of revenue

13.

Johanna A. Pro, Rendell, Business at Odds on Tax Loophole, PITTSBURGH POST-

GAZETTE, July 27, 2003, at El.
14. 2003 TAX DAY, supra note 5.

15. Testimony of Renee Blocker, Multistate Tax Commission, before the
Pennsylvania Business Tax Reform Commission, Aftemoon Session, May 17, 2004,
p.213, 238 [on file with author]; see also, Beth McConnell, The Great Escape: How
Major Corporations Avoid State Taxes, (PennPIRG and the PennPIRG Educ. Fund,

Philadelphia, Pa.), July 2003, at 3.
16. Mazerov, supra note 4, at 5.

2005]

PENNSYLVANIA'S USE OF THE SHAM TRANSACTION DOCTRINE

1227

Pennsylvania could raise by closing this loophole.
The Rendell
Administration estimates that $100 million in revenue from state taxes
could be raised by closing this tax loophole.1 7 In contrast, the
Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce, in testimony before the
Pennsylvania House Finance Committee," estimates the increase in state
revenues recouped from closing the IHC loophole to be in the range of
one to two billion dollars.' 9 Although it is likely that neither estimate is
wholly accurate,20 Pennsylvania clearly stands to raise a significant
amount of revenue if the General Assembly can develop a strategy to
close the IHC loophole found in the state's corporate tax statutes.
Closing the IHC loophole would be an achievement of great significance
given Pennsylvania's recent budget crisis.
A.

Effect of the IHC Structure on Federal Taxes

It is important to have a general understanding of how corporations
structure both the relationship between the parent company and its IHC
subsidiary, and the transaction between the two companies to fully
understand the resultant tax consequences of the IHC loophole and what
measures Pennsylvania can take to plug this loophole. This transaction
has different tax consequences at the federal and state levels, but it is the
combined savings in both arenas that makes the IHC such a viable and
lucrative tax strategy.21
A recent example, involving WorldCom, Inc. (WorldCom),
illustrates the effect a corporation's use of the IHC loophole has on its
taxable income.2 2 After WorldCom filed for bankruptcy protection in
July 2002,23 documents admitted in the bankruptcy proceedings revealed
that the corporation may have avoided hundreds of millions of dollars in
state taxes by passing almost $19 million in revenue through a Delaware
intangible holding company.24 Pursuant to the advice of the accounting
firm of KPMG, LLP, 25 WorldCom transferred the rights to its trademarks
17. Pro, supra note 13.
18. Hearing on HB 1305 Before the House Finanace Committee, 2003 Leg., (Pa.
2003) (written testimony of Jim Welty, Vice President, Legislative and Corporate Affairs
of the Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry).
19. McConnell, supra note 15 at 5.
20. Id. at 6. PennPIRG, analyzing the revenues generated by states who had
successfully closed the IHC loophole, puts the estimate at closer to $296 million.
21. Id. at7.
22. Carrick Mollenkamp et al., WorldCom Tax Strategy May Have Helped it Save
Millions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2003, at C1.
23. Id.
24. Id. at Cl. In Mollenkamp's article the Delaware IHC is referred to as a "passive
investment company."
25. KPMG, LLP, U.S. member firm of KPMG International, a Swiss Cooperative.
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to the Delaware IHC, which then leased use of the trademark back to
WorldCom's parent company and other subsidiaries.26 This transaction
allowed WorldCom to deduct the royalties paid to the Delaware IHC 27 as
an expense while at the same time generating untaxed income for the
Delaware IHC.28
Why is this type of transaction problematic for Pennsylvania tax
purposes?
The issue arises when companies engaged in these
transactions file a federal consolidated income tax return. For illustration
purposes, let us consider a hypothetical corporation under the name
PMG, Inc. (PMG). PMG is located in Pennsylvania and is the parent
corporation of a wholly owned subsidiary, MacCOM, another
hypothetical corporation, located in Delaware. Together these two
corporations form an affiliated group. 29 After MacCOM is formed, PMG

345 Park Avenue, New York, New York, 10154-0102, (212)758-9700.
26. Mollenkamp, supra note 22, at Cl.
27. It could be argued that WorldCom's choice to incorporate their subsidiary in
Delaware was motivated by the fact that Delaware does not tax income generated from
the use of intangibles. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30 § 1902 (1997):
Imposition of tax on corporations; exemptions
(8) Corporations whose activities within this State are confined to the
maintenance and management of their intangible investments or of the
intangible investments of corporations or statutory trusts or business trusts
registered as investment companies under the Investment Company Act of
1940, as amended (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.) and the collection and distribution
of the income from such investments or from tangible property physically
located outside this State. For purposes of this paragraph, "intangible
investments" shall include without limitation, investments in stocks, bonds,
notes and other debt obligations (including debt obligations of affiliated
corporations), patents, patent applications, trademarks, trade names and similar
types of intangible assets;
tit. 30, § 1902 (1997).
Corporations also establish these IHCs in states such as Nevada, which does not tax
corporate income, Michigan, which exempts from tax, interest income and income
generated through the payment of royalties, and those states which have combined
reporting (resulting in an elimination of intercompany transactions from the corporation's
income). Reason, supra note 6. See also, Simpson supra note 3, at Al.
28. Timothy H. Gillis, States Apply the Federal Sham Transaction Doctrine to
Intangibles Holding Companies, 2003 J. TAX'N. 173.
Under Delaware statute,
specifically DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902, income received from intangibles is not
subject to tax.
29. I.R.C. § 1504 (2002).
(a) Affiliated group defined for purposes of this subtitle(1) In general. The term "affiliated group" means(A) 1 or more chains of includable corporations connected through
stock ownership with a common parent corporation which is an
includable corporation, includable corporations;
I.R.C. § 1504 (2002).
DEL. CODE ANN.
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transfers ownership of its intangible property 30 to MacCOM. MacCOM
then leases the use of the intangibles 3' back to PMG. 32 PMG is required
to pay a royalty fee to MacCOM for the use of intangible property that
PMG would previously have been free to use without expense.3 3
Under Section 1501 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC),34
corporations in an affiliated group may elect to file a consolidated tax
return instead of filing separate returns for the parent company and each
of its subsidiaries.35 The function of the consolidated return is to treat
the affiliated group of corporations as a single taxable entity.36 Because
PMG and MacCOM are treated as a single taxable entity, transactions
between the two corporations will not generate any income or deduction
for the group.37
In generating a consolidated tax return, the corporation and its
subsidiaries must first compute the taxable income of each member of
the group, as if each member were filing separate tax returns. 38 The
separate incomes of PMG and MacCOM are required to be prepared on
an income statement and filed with separate columns for each member in
the group. 39 The income and expense of each member of the group is
30. "Intangibles" are defined by the Internal Revenue Code under I.R.C.
§ 936(h)(3)(B) (2002):
Intangible property. The term "intangible property" means any(i) patent, invention, formula, process, design, pattern, or know-how
(ii) copyright, literary, musical or artistic composition;
(iii) trademark, trade name or brand name;
(iv) franchise, license, or contract;
(v) method, program, system, procedure, campaign, survey, study,
forecast, estimate, customer list, or technical data; or
(vi) any similar item, which has substantial value independent of the
services of any individual;
I.R.C. § 936(h)(3)(B) (2002).
H.B. 1305 defines intangible property as: "patents, patent applications, trade names,
trademarks, service marks, copyrights, mask works, trade secrets, and similar types of
intangible assets." H.B. 1305, 2003-2004 Sess., § (3)(t)(3)(B).
31. For purposes of the hypothetical, "intangibles" refer to PMG's trademarks,
patents, and service marks.
32. See Simpson, supra note 3, at Al.
33. See infra Figure 2 accompanying note 71.
34. I.R.C. § 1501 (2002).
35. Id.
36. Textron Inc. v. Comm'r, 336 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2003). "The consolidated
regulations are built on the premise that members of a consolidated group are a single
economic entity with regard to intercompany transactions and distributions ....
Id. at
29.
37. Id. (resulting gain or loss from intercompany transaction given effect only when
transacted property leaves the affiliated group).
38. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1502-1(a)(1) (2003). See also JACK CRESTOL ET AL., THE
CONSOLIDATED TAX RETURN: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE, PLANNING 5-4 (2d ed. 1980).
39. CRESTOL, supra note 38, at app. 1 (discussing Regulation Section 1.1502-750)).
Note that each corporation's separate income will reflect the income or expense
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then combined, and adjustments are made to generate the combined
income and expenses for the group. 40 The corporation, in what is
commonly referred to as the "elimination column," eliminates 41 from the
combined income and expenses of the group any income or expense
generated by intercompany transactions.4 2 The result is the consolidated
taxable income for the affiliated group 4 3 that is filed on Line 28 of Form
1120, the U.S. Corporate Income Tax Return.
In situations where a corporation is required to pay a member of the
affiliated group a royalty for the use of an intangible, a deduction can be
44
taken in the calculation of the paying corporation's separate income,
thereby reducing the amount of profit the paying corporation realizes.45
Similarly, the corporation charging for the use of the intangible is able to
recognize income.4 6 However, because any profit or loss gained from the
transactions between members of the affiliated group is eliminated,47 the
income generated from these intercompany transactions is never taxed by

generated from the transaction between members of the affiliated group. MacCOM's
income will include the amount gained from the cost charged to PMG for the use of the
intangible property and PMG's income will be reduced by the amount paid to MacCOM.
See id.
40. BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS

15-50 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 5th ed. 1987)

(1959).
41. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1502(c)(6)(ii)(A) (2003).
42. Id. § 1.1502-13(b)(1)(i).
(b) Definitions. For purposes of this section(1) Intercompany transactions-(i) In general.
An intercompany
transaction is a transaction between corporations that are members of the
same consolidated group immediately after the transaction. S is the
member transferring property or providing services, and B is the member
receiving the property or services. Intercompany transactions include(A) S's sale of property (or other transfer, such as an exchange or
contribution) to B, whether or not gain or loss is recognized;
(B) S's performance of services for B, and B's payment or accrual of
its expenditure for S's performance;
(C) S's licensing of technology, rental of property, or loan of money
to B, and B's payment or accrual of its expenditure; and
(D) S's distribution to B with respect to S stock.
Id.
43. BiTTKER, supra note 40, at 15-50.
44. Id. at 15-53.
45. Mazerov, supra note 4, at 5-6.
46. BITTKER, supra note 40, at 15-50.
47. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1502(c)(6)(ii)(A) (2003).
(ii) Limitation on treatment of intercompany items as excluded from gross
income. Notwithstanding the general rule of paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section,
S's intercompany income or gain is redetermined to be excluded from gross
income.
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the Federal Government.48 Additionally, the IHC will often loan4 9 the
profits generated from the transaction to other corporations in the
affiliated group or distribute the profits as a dividend. 50 The corporation
receiving the loan is able to deduct the interest payments as an additional
expense against income 5' and is not taxed on the distribution of
dividends.5 2
B. IHCs and Pennsylvania CorporateNet Income Tax
While PMG and MacCOM may elect to file a consolidated Return
with the federal government, Pennsylvania, under Section 7404 of the
Tax Reform Code of 1971 (TRC),53 does not permit any corporation,
subject to Pennsylvania state tax, to file a consolidated tax return that
shows the consolidated net income of all members of an affiliated group
of companies.5 4 Therefore, in Pennsylvania, each member of the
affiliated group must file its own return.5 5 Those corporations taxed in
Pennsylvania have established a nexus 56 with the state that is a
"substantial connection between the taxed activity and the taxing state;
something beyond mere solicitation. ''57 Given this definition, those
members of the corporate group who can establish nexus with
Pennsylvania are taxed by Pennsylvania on a separate entity basis.58
Those members who do not have a nexus with the state, specifically
the Delaware IHC in the hypothetical, MacCOM, are not taxed by the
state. 59 Therefore, income generated by MacCOM through the lease
back of the intangible to PMG may not be taxed by Pennsylvania while
PMG, who may be taxed by the state, has reduced its taxable income by
the expense paid to use the intangible property owned by MacCOM.
48. Id.
49. Mazerov, supra note 4, at 5. See also Simpson, supra note 3, at Al.
50. BiTTKER, supra note 40, at 15-5 1.
51. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1502-13(f)(2)(ii) (2003).
52. I.R.C. § 243 (2002) (dividends paid among affiliated corporations are completely
exempt from federal taxes).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7404 (2003).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Corporations who establish sufficient nexus with the state are said to be "doing
business" in Pennsylvania. Id. A corporation can be said to be doing business when it is
1) doing business in Pennsylvania; 2) carrying on activities in Pennsylvania; 3) having
capital or property employed or used in Pennsylvania; and 4) owning property in
Pennsylvania. See LAURENCE R. CUSACK, J.D., LLM, PENNSYLVANIA TAX HANDBOOK 179
(American Lawyer Media 2000). Note that "doing business" as used within § 7404 is not
clearly defined in the tax statutes and the courts have never articulated a definition for the
term. Id.
57. CUSACK, supra note 56, at 181.
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(1) (2003).
59. Id.
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Pennsylvania derives a corporation's taxable income from the
taxable income calculated by the Federal Government. 60 To determine
the taxable income of PMG (the hypothetical parent corporation, which
filed a consolidated return with the federal government), Pennsylvania
looks to the "taxable income [of the corporation] which would have been
returned to, and ascertained by the federal government if separate returns
had been made to the federal government ... ,,61 Because PMG's federal

return lists only the group's consolidated income, PMG must generate a
"pro forma" 62 Federal Form 1120 return with Line 28 listing only the
income generated by the filing corporation, PMG.63 The income is then
increased and reduced by specific additions and deductions allowed by

Pennsylvania.64 Therefore, a corporation's Pennsylvania taxable income
is Federal taxable income,6 5 plus Pennsylvania additions, minus
Pennsylvania deductions. 66 Recall that pro-forma Line 28 is generated

by establishing a corporation's earned income and then subtracting any
expenses, including expenses paid to a subsidiary for the use of
intangibles. As a result, when Pennsylvania adopts a corporation's
federal taxable income, this income has been reduced substantially by
any cost the corporation has incurred through the lease of the intangibles.
However, because the Delaware IHC does not have a sufficient nexus
with Pennsylvania, the income the IHC earns from the transfer of the
60.

Id. at § 7401(3)(1)(a).

61.

Id.

62. Id. § 7403(a)(1)(2).
(1) A true copy of its return to the Federal Government of the annual taxable
income arising or accruing in the calendar or fiscal year next preceding, or such
part or portions of said return, as the department may designate;
(2) If no return was filed with the Federal Government the Report made to the
department shall show such information as would have been contained in a
return to the Federal Government had one been made;
Id. at § 7401(3)(1)(a).
"Pro forma" is defined "as a matter of form or for the sake of form." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1212 (8th ed. 1999). Because the companies in the affiliated group did not
file separate tax returns to the federal government, they are required to generate "as a
matter of form" a return that the company would have filed had they filed on a separate
tax return with the Federal Government. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7407 (2003).
63. 61 Pa. Code § 153(l)(a) (2003).
Recall the income calculated for each
corporation within the group when determining the group consolidated taxable income.
64. Pennsylvania additions include: taxes imposed on or measured by net income,
taxes not clearly measured on by net income, federal environmental tax and federal tax
preference items. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)(1)(o) (2003).
Pennsylvania
deductions include: dividends received that are included in federal taxable income, state
and federal interest, depreciation, wages related to federal jobs tax credit and other
specialized deductions. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401(3)(1)(b)-(c) (2003).
65. The Federal taxable income is the income before net operating loss and special
deductions, a.k.a. pro forma Line 28.
66. CUSACK, supra note 56, at 192.
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intangibles is not taxed by Pennsylvania.67 The income generated by the
Delaware IHC is not subject to tax by Delaware because Delaware does
not tax income generated by the use of intangibles nor is the income
taxed by the Federal Government, which disregards transactions made
between members of the same group who have filed a consolidated
return. 68 Essentially, this income is generated tax-free. 69 This scenario is
problematic when the transactions between the two companies are less
than arms-length 70 and are entered into for the purpose of avoiding
higher payments of state income tax.
Figure 271
PMG, Inc.

MacCOM
PMG transfers ownership of intangibles
MacCOM leases use of intangibles
back to PMG (royalty expense)

67. Id. at 179.
68. See supra Part A.
69. E-mail from Marvin Kirsner, Esq., Greenberg, Trauring, LLP, Boca Raton
Office (Jan. 7, 2003, 16:19 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kirsner I].
70. To determine whether a transaction is arms-length, a court will evaluate
"whether the terms of the transaction under consideration are such as would have been
arrived at in independent transactions with or between unrelated parties under similar
circumstances." Wisconsin Big Boy Corp. v. Comm'r, 452 F.2d 137, 140 (7th Cir.
1971); see also, 26 C.F.R. § 1.482 (2003).
71. Figures 2, 2.1, and 2.2 illustrate how the corporations set up the intercompany
transaction and the effect that this transaction has on the amount of income subject to
Pennsylvania tax. Figure 2 shows how PMG, the parent corporation transfers ownership
of its intangible property to MacCOM, the subsidiary corporation. MacCOM then leases
back the use of the intangible to PMG for which PMG pays an expense. Figure 2.1 is a
simplified calculation of the taxable income PMG would earn if the intercompany
transaction did not occur. After calculating income and expenses, PMG would be taxed
on $600,000 worth of income by Pennsylvania. Conversely, Figure 2.2 illustrates the
decrease in PMG's Pennsylvania taxable income which is the result of the expense PMG
pays to MacCOM for the use of the intangible with a result that Pennsylvania taxes on
$350,000 of income as opposed to $600,000 that would have been taxed had the
transaction never occurred. Recall that because MacCOM is located in Delaware and
cannot establish nexus with Pennsylvania, the $150,000 it has earned in income is not
taxed by Pennsylvania. Nor is the income taxed by Delaware, which does not tax income
earned from intangibles, or by the federal government, which does not tax income or
expenses earned through intercompany transactions.
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Plugging the IHC Loophole

With many states facing large budget deficits and struggling to
generate additional revenue,7 2 it has become imperative that each state

develop strategies to combat corporations' "tax sheltering practices.
In

combating

the

IHC

loophole,

states

have

employed

73

different

techniques, including changes in their state corporate tax statutes 74 and
challenges to the IHC structure based on arguments developed in the
federal courts. 75 The Pennsylvania Legislature, using somewhat of a
hybrid strategy, has attempted to close the IHC loophole through the
introduction of House Bill 1305 (H.B. 1305),76 which seeks to alter the
72. Johnson, supra note 7.
73. See supra Part III.
74. Sixteen states (California, Illinois, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas,
Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon,
and Utah) require corporations to file their state taxes under a system of "combined
reporting." Mazerov, supra note 4. Combined reporting eliminates intercompany
transactions by requiring affiliated groups of corporations to add together for tax
purposes the profits of the IHC and the corporation paying the royalties and interest and
prevents or significantly decreases the probability that the corporation will benefit from
the IHC loophole. Id. at app. A. Seven states (Alabama, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Ohio) have enacted laws that in some form
or another prevent corporations from taking deductions for any royalty or interest
payments the corporation made to another corporation within the affiliated group. Id.
These statutes have been a quick fix to the IHC problem, buying states time until they can
develop a more comprehensive plan to shut down the IHC loophole. Id. at app. A. See
also, Reason, supra note 6.
75. Gillis, supra note 28, at 174. These arguments include: 1) economic nexus;
2) distortion of income; and 3) sham transaction. This Comment focuses on the sham
transaction argument.
76. H.B. 1305, 2003-2004 Sess., § (3)(t)(3)(B). Introduced by Representative David
K. Levdansky to Pennsylvania House of Representatives on May 5, 2003, available at
http://www.legis.state.pa.us. The author would like to note that after its introduction
before the House, H.B. 1305 was referred to the House Finance Committee on May 5,
2003. However, no action was taken on the bill before the 2003-2004 legislative session
ended and as such H.B. 1305 failed.
See HB 1305 History, available at
http://www.legis.state.pa.us. However the author believes that given the importance of
the issue addressed by H.B. 1305 and Pennsylvania's current attempt to reform the way
corporations are taxed through the Pennsylvania Business Tax Reform Commission, the
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definition of taxable income to permit the state to disallow deductions
taken against the corporation's taxable income unless the corporation can
show that the transaction that generated the deduction had substantial
business purpose and economic substance.77
A.

FederalSham Transaction Doctrine

At the federal level, states began challenging the IHC structure with
arguments based on economic nexus,78 distortion,79 and the sham
transaction doctrine. 80 The sham transaction doctrine looks to the
purpose of a corporation's transaction and its economic effects to
determine if the corporation entered into the transaction because of a
valid business purpose or merely as a "sham" to obtain maximum tax
benefits. 81 The Pennsylvania General Assembly focused on the sham
transaction doctrine, in essence codifying the doctrine in H.B. 1305,82 in
an attempt to close the IHC loophole and recoup lost corporate income
tax revenues.
Most courts cite,the United States Supreme Court case of Gregory
v. Helvering8 3 as the origin of the sham transaction doctrine. The
issues raised by H.B. 1305 will continue to be relevant.
77. Id. See also, Gillis, supra note 28, at 177. "Substantial business purpose" and
"economic substance" are elements which find their source in the sham transaction
doctrine which was developed by the federal courts to test the validity of transactions
entered into by taxpayers to avoid or lessen the payment of taxes. Id.
78. The economic nexus argument, which was first publicized in Geoffrey Inc. v.
South Carolina Tax Commission, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C., 1993), is based on the theory that
although the IHC does not have a physical presence within the taxing state, it licenses
products to a taxpayer which does have a physical presence in the taxing state and who
also uses the products in the taxing state. Id. This contact establishes a nexus between
the IHC and the taxing state which is sufficient to require the IHC to pay taxes on the
income earned from the licensing of the products to the taxing state. E-mail from Marvin
Kirsner, Esq., Greenberg, Trauring, LLP, Boca Raton Office (Jan. 7, 2003, 16:22 EST)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Kirsner II]; see also, Marvin Kirsner, Congress May
Resolve Battle Over Intangible Holding Companies in Practical U.S. Tax Strategies,
September 2002, Vol. 2, Number 9 [on file with author]; Gillis, supra note 28, at 174.
79. Under the laws of several states, most notably New York, there exits a rebuttable
presumption that income is distorted when an affiliated group engages in intercompany
transactions. Gillis, supra note 28, at 174. The presumption may be rebutted if the
corporations can show that the transaction was made at arms-length using fair pricing.
Id. However companies which fail to rebut the presumption will be required to file a
combined return. Id.
80. Id.
81. Kirsner II, supra note 78; see also, Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S.
561 (1978); Gillis, supra note 28 at 176-177; Syms Corp. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 765
N.E.2d 758, 760 (2002) (stating that a "sham transaction" in this context means a
transaction that in fact occurred in an effort to exploit a feature of the tax laws, not a
transaction that did not occur or did not occur as reported).
82. H.B. 1305, 2003-2004 Session, § (3)(t)(2)(a).
83. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). See Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 561; Syms Corp., 765
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Helvering case dealt with revenue earned by a corporation from the sale
of stock the corporation had received from its subsidiary after the
subsidiary was liquidated.84 The parent corporation, United Mortgage
Corporation (UMC), was wholly owned by the Petitioner in the case,
Gregory, and held as an asset 100 shares of stock in a second
corporation, Monitor Securities Corporation (Monitor).85 Gregory then
86
organized a subsidiary corporation, the Averill Corporation (Averill).
Gregory transferred the 1,000 shares of Monitor stock to Averill in
exchange for ownership of all the shares of Averill. 87 Shortly after
Averill was created, it was dissolved and its assets were liquidated and
distributed to its shareholders, namely Gregory through UMC. 88 The
Monitor shares were then sold, resulting in a gain for Gregory in excess
of $76,000.89 The Commissioner of the IRS found that Gregory was
required to pay a tax on the gain as if UMC had paid Gregory "a
dividend in the amount realized from the sale of the Monitor shares." 90
The Supreme Court affirmed. 91 The Court referred to the transaction as
"an operation having no business or corporate purpose. 92 In describing
the new corporation that was formed the Court stated: "No doubt a new
and valid corporation was created. But that corporation was nothing
more than a contrivance., 93 The Court concluded by saying that to deem
the transaction as anything but a sham would be "[to] exalt artifice above
reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious
purpose., 94 The thrust of the Helvering decision was articulated as
recently as 2002 by the court in IRS v. CmHoldings,95 when it stated that
"the courts will not elevate the form of the transaction over its substance.
Even if a transaction complies precisely with all requirements for
obtaining a deduction, if [the transaction] lacks economic substance [the
transaction] is simply not recognized for federal transaction purposes. 96
97
The court in ACM Partnershipv. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
N.E.2d at 763; Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 778 N.E.2d 504, 513
(Mass. 2002); see also Gillis, supra note 28, at 176.
84. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 465.
85. Id. at 467.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 467 (1935).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 469.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 470.
95. 301 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2002).
96. Id.
97. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
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interpreted Helvering as requiring the court to look to the transaction to
determine what "actually occurred," 98 rather than the form of the
transaction to ascertain the tax consequences of the transaction.99
After Helvering was decided, courts began to apply the sham
transaction doctrine to uphold or strike down taxpayer's business
transactions. °° Over time there was confusion as to whether the doctrine
required a rigid two-pronged analysis which required that the courts find
the absence of both a valid business purpose and an economic substance
for a transaction to be considered a sham or whether all that was required
was failure in one area.' 0 l The debate was seemingly resolved with the
decision of United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (UPS), 0 2 in which the court applied a more refined
sham transaction doctrine and conducted an analysis which was focused
"less on the business purpose" of the transaction between UPS and its
subsidiaries 0 3 and more on the "substantive activities of the resulting
enterprise."' 1 4 Using the UPS analysis, courts would still examine the
economic substance and business purpose of a transaction, but the issue
98. Id. at 250 (citing Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469).
99. Id.
100. See. e.g., Frank Lyon v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 435 U.S. 561 (ruling that
sale and leaseback of building for tax purposes is not a sham because of economic
substance); Merryman v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 873 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1989)
(finding that a partnership formed to operate oil rig lacked economic substance and
served no purpose other than creation of tax benefits); Sochin v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 843 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that straddle transactions in forward
contracts are a sham).
101. See Rice's Toyota World v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th
Cir. 1985) ("To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was
motivated by no business purpose other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the
transaction, and that the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable
possibility of profit exists."); Casebeer v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 909 F.2d 1360
(9th Cir. 1990); but see Sochin v. Comm'r, 843 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he
consideration of business purpose and economic substance are simply more precise
factors to consider in the application of the court's traditional sham analysis; that is
whether the transaction had any practical economic effects other than the creation of
income tax losses ....
Thus the tax court's failure to specifically delineate a two-pronged
test and the factual findings to support each prong is not fatal."); ACM Partnership v.
Comm'r, 157 F.3d at 247 (3d Cir. 1998); James v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 899 F.2d
905 (10th Cir. 1990).
102. 254 F.3d 1014 (11 th Cir. 2001).
103. The facts of UPS centered around the restructuring of the carrier's excess-value
insurance program. Id. at 1014. UPS, which used to administer the program in-house,
entered into a transaction with an outside insurance company to insure the excess value
packages. Id. UPS then created a subsidiary corporation which entered into a
reinsurance agreement with the insurance company in exchange for a premium in the
amount the insurance company received from UPS. Id. Because the reinsurance
corporation was a subsidiary of UPS, UPS received the fee paid to the subsidiary by the
insurance agency however UPS never claimed any income from the program. Id.
104. Gillis, supra note 28, at 177.
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would be less about the motivation of the parent corporation for entering
into the transaction and more about the activity engaged in by the newly
created subsidiary. 0 5 Although a corporation's transaction may have as
its motivation the reduction of taxes, this motive would not be fatal if it
figured into an "existing, bona-fide, profit seeking business."' 10 6 A
corporation would not be penalized for altering its legitimate business
structure in order to reap the tax benefits that accompany the
reorganization; 10 however, the court would find no valid business
purpose when the transaction "would not have occurred, in any form, but
for tax avoidance reasons."' 0 8
B.

State Solutions to the IHC Problem

A few states'0 9 have begun to apply the reasoning of the UPS court
and have used the sham transaction doctrine to challenge corporation's
IHC structures." 0 Massachusetts has been the forerunner among the
states using the doctrine as evidenced by the prominent decisions of
Syms Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue l l and Sherwin- Williams
Company v. Commissioner of Revenue." 2
These decisions are
illustrative of the states' use of the sham transaction doctrine to challenge
IHC structures and the relative success of the strategy. Both decisions
rely on the arguments set forth by the federal courts regarding the
existence of a sham transaction, however each court reached a different
result as to whether
the transaction entered into by each corporation was
3
in fact a sham. 1

The facts in Syms Corp. reveal a transaction strikingly similar to the
one described between the hypothetical corporations PMG and
MacCOM. Like PMG, Syms Corp. (Syms) formed a wholly owned
subsidiary corporation, SYL, Inc. (SYL) located in Delaware. 1 4 As in
the hypothetical, Syms transferred ownership of its trademarks to

105.

Id.

106.

UPS, 254F.3d at 1020; see also, ACM Partnership,157F.3d at 261.

107.

Id. at 1019 (stating the concept of business purpose is a corollary to the axiom
that taxpayers have a legal right to decrease their tax liability). See Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
108. UPS, 254 F.3d at 1020 (emphasis in original); see, e.g., Rice's Toyota World v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 752 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1985) (deeming that a sale-leaseback
of a computer by a car dealership solely to generate depreciation deductions is a sham).
109. Gillis, supra note 28, at 180 ("States have employed the sham transaction
doctrine in at least five other instances involving an [IHC]").
110. Kirsner, supra note 78; see also, Gillis, supra note 28, at 173.
111. 765 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 2002).
112. 778 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 2002).
113. Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 764; Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 516-19.
114. Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 761.
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SYL. 1 5 After the trademarks were transferred, Syms entered into a
licensing agreement with SYL in which Syms agreed to pay a royalty to
SYL in exchange for use of the trademarks."1 6 The transaction was
structured so that SYL would receive the royalty payment from Syms,
hold the payment in Delaware for a "few weeks,"'1 17 and then transfer the
payment back to Syms as a tax-free dividend.' 18 SYL's only income
came from the annual royalty payments the corporation received from
Syms. 119 SYL's office consisted of a rented Delaware address which
cost SYL an annual fee of $1,200.120 The transfer and license back of the
trademarks did not affect the business operations of Syms; the company
still maintained and protected the trademarks, paying the fees of the New
York City trademark law firm who performed the service. 121 Syms
controlled the advertising and quality control of the trademarks and the
choice of which products would be sold under each trademark.1 22 The
facts indicate that Syms's motivation for1 23entering into the transaction
was the reduction of Syms's income taxes.
As in the IHC cases at the federal level, the Syms court found that
the proper inquiry into the validity of the transaction was found in the
sham transaction doctrine and whether or not the transaction had
economic substance and business purpose.1 24 The court was unclear as to
whether this analysis was a two-pronged analysis requiring either an
economic substance or a business purpose for the transaction to be valid
or instead whether economic substance and business purpose were only
factors to consider when determining whether the transaction had any
practical effect beyond tax avoidance. 25 The court upheld the Appellate
Tax Board's (Board) finding that the transaction between Syms and SYL
had no economic effects other than the creation of tax benefits and the
only business purpose of the transaction was tax avoidance. 26 The court
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 762.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 761.
124. Id. at 762.
125. Id. at 764. The court cites both the decision in Casebeer v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 909 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (ruling that the taxpayer must show both
that the transaction was supported by business purpose other than tax avoidance and had
economic substance other than the creation of tax benefit) and James v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 899 F.2d 905, 908-09 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the consideration
of business purpose and economic substance are factors in determining whether
transaction had any practical effect other than creation of income tax losses).
126. Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 764.
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focuses its discussion on the business purpose of Syms's transaction,
noting that a motive of tax avoidance is not fatal to the business purpose
analysis. 2 7 However, the business purpose must be "more than
theoretical musings, concocted to provide faint cover for the creation of
the tax deduction."'' 28 After looking closely at the transaction between
Syms and SYL, the court determined that although on the surface the
arrangement between the two corporations resembled a legitimate
transaction between two viable businesses, the way that the transaction
was structured, Syms's continued control over the trademarks, and
SYL's retention of Syms's royalty payment for a minimal time period
before distributing the payment to Syms as a dividend revealed29a sham
created for the sole purpose of reducing Syms's taxable income. 1
The facts in Sherwin-Williams, 30 while fundamentally similar to
those presented in Syms Corp., are significantly different. SherwinWilliams formed to wholly owned subsidiary corporations located in
Delaware, Sherwin-Williams Investment Management Company, Inc.
(SWIMC) and Dupli-Color Investment Management Company, Inc.
(DIMC).' 3' These corporations were formed with the intent that SWIMC
and DIMC would maintain control of the corporation's domestic
The trademarks were owned by each of the
trademarks. 132
33
and Sherwin-Williams paid a royalty fee to each
corporations,
corporation for the use of the trademarks.1 34 The royalty fees paid were
equal to the fair market value of the trademarks and were determined by
an independent appraisal company. 35 After their formation, each
subsidiary operated as an ongoing business, entering into nonexclusive
licensing agreements with both Sherwin-Williams and unrelated third
parties, setting their own investment policies, paying taxes, hiring outside
companies to audit the company and perform quality control and hiring,
and paying outside counsel to represent them in trademark

127. Id. at 764 n.8.
128. Id. Among the business purposes offered by Syms and rejected by the Board
were protection of the trademarks from creditors and hostile takeovers, better

management of the trademarks, and enhanced ability to borrow funds. Id.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 764-65.
Sherwin-Williams v. Comm'r of Revenue, 778 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 2002).
Id. at 508.
Id. at 509. At the board meeting creating SWIMC and DIMC, Sherwin-

Williams's board listed eleven reasons for the creation of the subsidiaries including:
improved quality control, increased profitability, increased ability to enter into third party
contracts, and insulation of the marks from Sherwin-Williams's liability. Id.
133. Id. SWIMC controlled the trademarks of all nonaerosol products, and DIMC
controlled the trademarks of all aerosol products. Id. at 510.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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proceedings. 136 Corporate
formalities among each of the corporations
137
were strictly observed.
Sherwin-Williams appealed a decision of the Board which upheld a
ruling by the Commissioner of Revenue to disallow $47 million in
expense deductions that Sherwin-Williams claimed against its 1991
taxable income.1 38 Sherwin-Williams claimed these expenses were
incurred from royalty payments the company paid to SWIMC and DIMC
for the use of the trademarks held by each of the companies.1 39 The
Board found that the disallowance of these deductions was valid because
the "transfer and license back of the [trade]marks was a sham and could
be disregarded under the sham transaction doctrine." 140
The
Massachusetts Supreme Court, after reviewing the findings of the Board,
struck down the decision, holding that the transaction between SherwinWilliams and its subsidiaries was not a sham and 14that
the expenses
1
incurred from the transaction were properly deducted.
As stated by the court in Syms, Massachusetts had recognized the
sham transaction doctrine as a means for states "to disregard for tax
purposes those transactions that have no economic substance or business
purpose other than tax avoidance. ,1 42 The Sherwin-Williams court, like
the Syms court, adopted the use of this doctrine to challenge IHC
transactions, but the Sherwin- Williams court took the analysis one step
further by applying the refined sham transaction doctrine found in the
UPS decision.1 43 The court found that the better analysis was one that
required the court to examine whether the transaction had economic
effects besides the creation of tax benefits and whether the transaction
was formed for a "substantial business purpose" 144 or "substantive
business activity. 1 45 The court found that Sherwin-Williams's use of the
IHC structure was valid and that the transaction between SherwinWilliams, SWIMC, and DIMC was not sham because the transaction had
both economic substance and a valid business purpose. 146 In contrast to
the Syms transaction, Sherwin-Williams structured its transaction in such
136. Id. at 511.
137. Id. 778 N.E.2d at 512.
138. Id. at 507.
139. Id. at 508.
140. Id. The board also found the disallowance to be valid under the theory that the
royalty payments were not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses and
that under Massachusetts law, the commissioner could eliminate the royalty payments
because they were not made at an arm's length. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 512.
143. Id. at 504, 516.
144. Id. at 516.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 508.
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a way that even though the creation of the two subsidiary corporations
resulted in tax savings for Sherwin-Williams, it also created two unique
147
business entities with real enforceable obligations and responsibilities.
IV. House Bill 1305
Similar to Massachusetts, Pennsylvania has sought to combat the
IHC structure by using the sham transaction doctrine to invalidate
deductions that arise from transactions between corporations and their
IHC subsidiaries. 148 However, rather than challenge the transaction at
the judicial level, Pennsylvania has attempted to codify the doctrine
through the introduction of H.B. 1305.149 Reducing the doctrine to
statutory form allows the state to combat the IHC structure at the agency
level 150 rather than through the courts. 151 However, the bill is structured

in such a way that the inquiry into the validity of the transaction may still
be decided by the courts; therefore, the effectiveness of H.B. 1305 can be
determined by examining the success other states have had when
challenging the doctrine in the court.
The primary purpose of H.B. 1305 is to change the definition of
taxable income to include income and deductions incurred through a
transaction whose principle purpose is the avoidance of state taxes. 152
147. Id. at 518 ("These changes resulted from the reorganization [of the business
structure of Sherwin-Williams] ... [and] are ample evidence of a reorganization that has
resulted in the creation of new viable business enterprises"). Id.
148. See H.B. 1305, 2003-2004 Sess., § (3)(t)(3)(B).
149. Id.
(3) "Taxable income." 1. ***
(t) (1) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), taxable income shall include the
amount of the deduction for interest expenses and costs and intangible
expenses and costs paid, accrued or incurred to, or in connection with one
or more transactions unless the corporation proves by clear and cogent
evidence that the transaction or transactions giving rise to the expenses
and costs did not have as a principal purpose the avoidance of any tax due
under this article. There shall be a presumption that a transaction between
a corporation and a person that is not a related member as defined in this
paragraph did not have as a principal purpose the avoidance of any tax due
under this article.
(2) Proof that the principal purpose of the transaction was not tax
avoidance may be required with the tax report for the applicable taxable
year and shall consist of:
(A) Proof that the transaction had a substantial business purpose and
economic substance and that the transaction involved was based upon
terms and conditions that are arm's length in nature;
Id.
150. Id. at pt. 5, In. 7 (conferring powers and imposing duties upon the Department of
Revenue).
151. Id. at pt. 2, In. 1-12.
152. Id. at pt. 2, In. 1-8.
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The pertinent language reads as follows:
Notwithstanding paragraph (a), taxable income shall include the
amount of the deduction for interest expenses and costs, intangible
expenses 153 and costs paid, accrued or incurred to, or in connection
with one or more transactions unless the corporation proves by clear
and cogent evidence that the transaction or transactions giving rise to
its principle purpose the
the expenses and costs did not have as 154
avoidance of any tax due under this article.
The bill places the burden on the taxpayer to offer evidence that the
principle purpose of the transaction is not tax avoidance. 51 5 The bill goes
further to create a presumption that transactions which occur between
unrelated entities156 do not have as their principle purpose tax
avoidance. 57 Presumably a corporation may have a tax avoidance
motive when engaging in an IHC transaction provided it is not the
primary motivation for entering into the transaction. From the bill's
language it can also be presumed that once a taxpayer has proven to the
satisfaction of the Department of Revenue (Department) that the
transaction does not have tax avoidance as its principle purpose, the
are not required to be included in
deductions derived from the transaction
158
income.
taxable
corporation's
the
The sham transaction doctrine appears in the bill as an element that
a corporation must prove in order to rebut the presumption that the
transaction 59was entered into with the primary purpose of tax
avoidance: 1
(2) Proof that the principle purpose of the transaction was not tax
avoidance may be required with the tax report for the applicable year
and shall consist of:
153. The bill defines intangible expenses as "expenses and costs for, related to or in
connection with the acquisition, use, maintenance, or management, ownership, sale,
exchange or any other disposition of intangible property[.]" H.B. 1305 at pt. 3, In. 3-5.
154. Id. atpt. 2,1n. 1-12.
155. Id. at pt. 2, In. 5-7.
156. Id. at pt. 3, In. 17-22.
(D) "Related entity" means any of the following:
(i) A corporation or a party related to the corporation in a manner that
would require an attribution of stock from the corporation to the party or
from the party to the corporation under attribution rules contained in
Section 318 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, if the corporation owns
directly, indirectly, beneficially or constructively, at least fifty percent of
the value of the corporation's outstanding stock.
Id.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at pt. 2, In. 8-12.
Id. at pt. 2, In. 1-12.
Id. at pt. 2, In. 13-26.
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A) Proof that the transaction had a substantial business purpose
and economic substance and that the transaction involved was
based upon
terms and conditions that are arms length in
60
nature;
The bill does not define what is required for a corporation to prove that a
transaction had business purpose or economic substance, 61 although it
should be noted that in order to disprove a primary motive of tax
avoidance, a corporation must make a showing that the transaction had
substantial business purpose and economic substance. 162 Because
"substantial business purpose" and "economic substance" are not
defined, taxpayers will be forced to seek guidance from the federal and
state courts from which the sham transaction doctrine was gleaned 163 in
order to determine what must be shown to satisfy these elements. If a
taxpayer fails to prove to the Secretary of the Department of Revenue
that the transaction's principle purpose is not tax avoidance, the
Secretary is authorized by H.B. 1305 to make adjustments to the
taxpayer's income to fairly reflect the realities of the transaction.' 64
V.

Does House Bill 1305 Really Work?

The Pennsylvania Legislature is off to a good start in its attempt to
combat the IHC tax loophole; however, the state's strategy is not as
effective as it purports to be. Drawing its strength from the sham
transaction doctrine, H.B. 1305, if adopted, allows Pennsylvania to
recoup lost tax revenue from those corporations who attempt to avoid
taxes through the IHC structure. 165
By codifying the doctrine,
Pennsylvania would ensure that every transaction entered into by
corporations for the creation of tax benefits must meet the standard of a
valid transaction articulated within the sham transaction doctrine without
the Department of Revenue having to go through the lengthy, and often
16 6
times costly, process of challenging each transaction in court.
However, upon closer examination, it seems that H.B. 1305, as it is
currently written, while effective at challenging those transactions that
are transparent tax avoidance schemes, is less successful at avoiding

160.
161.
162.

Id. at pt. 2, In. 13-19.
Id. at pt. 2, ln. 2-4.
Id. at pt. 2, ln. 16-17 (emphasis added).

163. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); United Parcel Service of
America, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001); SherwinWilliams v. Comm'r of Revenue, 778 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 2002); Syms Corp. v. Comm'r
of Revenue, 765 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 2002).
164. H.B. 1305, at pt. 5, In. 2-6.
165. Id. at pt. 2, In. 1-12.
166. Id.
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those transactions structured in such a way that satisfies H.B. 1305's
requirements while still resulting in enormous tax savings for the
corporation.
Similar to the sham transaction doctrine, H.B. 1305 speaks of
transactions that have no valid business purpose and economic
substance. 167 Corporations must prove that the transaction with their
IHC did not have as its principle purpose tax avoidance by showing that
the transaction had a substantial business purpose and economic
substance. 168 The bill, however, does not contain any definition of what
a corporation must show to prove that the transaction contained these
elements. 169 Without guidance from the Department, Pennsylvania
taxpayers will turn to the courts for a definition of what it means for a
transaction to have business purpose and economic substance. This
inquiry, in essence, usurps from the Department the power granted by
H.B. 1305 to determine which transactions are invalid for Pennsylvania
tax purposes and places it back in the hands of the courts. These courts
have begun to refrain from categorizing a transaction as a sham unless
the corporation can point to no other purpose for the transaction than the
creation of tax benefits;1 70 a showing that the corporation would not have
entered into the transaction if there were no tax benefits to be obtained. 171
The result is that Pennsylvania, even with the codification of the sham
transaction doctrine, will only be able to invalidate those transactions
structured in a way that makes it obvious to the agency that the sole
purpose of the transaction is tax avoidance. 72 Any structure that seems
to have a legitimate purpose and effect other than tax avoidance will be
upheld even in the face of H.B. 1305.173 This argument is strengthened
by the language of H.B. 1305, which states that only those transactions
with a principlepurpose of tax avoidance may be restructured to include
in taxable income any deductions generated through the intercompany
transaction.1 74 Corporations can overcome this "principle purpose"
requirement and save the transaction from being deemed a "sham" by
asserting reasons other than the creation of tax benefits as their primary

167. Id. at pt. 2, In. 16-19.
168. Id. at pt. 2, In. 13-19. The taxpayer must also present evidence that the
transaction between the corporation and the IHC was conducted at arms length.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., TIFD III-E Inc. v. U.S., 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004).
171. See Sherwin-Williams v. Comm'r of Revenue, 778 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 2002);
United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 254 F.3d 1014
(11 th Cir. 2001); SYL Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury (Md. Tax Ct. 1999); Gillis,
supra note 28 at 178.
172. See Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 758.
173. See Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 504.
174. H.B. 1305, at pt. 2, In. 1-12 (emphasis added).
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motivation for entering into the transaction. 175
House Bill 1305 requires corporate taxpayers to show that the
transaction between the corporation and the IHC has a substantial
business purpose and economic substance. Again the bill is silent as to
what evidence corporations must present to satisfy this level of proof.
Because taxpayers will be forced to turn to the courts for an answer to
this question, a closer look at the Syms and Sherwin-Williams decisions
may offer assistance as to what factors a court will examine to determine
when a transaction has a substantial business purpose and economic
substance. These cases are good illustrations of the types of transactions
the courts will consider to be shams. Both cases were argued on the
same day and decided by the same court during roughly the same time
period; however, the court reached two different conclusions given
roughly the same facts. 176 The differences in the way each company
177
structured the relationship with its IHC were the determinative factors
which swayed the court into concluding either that the transaction was
valid or a sham which could be disregarded for tax purposes. Because
H.B. 1305 does not define what it means for a transaction to have a
substantial business purpose and economic effect, corporations subject to
the provisions of H.B. 1305 need only structure their transaction in a
manner similar to Sherwin-Williams, whose transaction was deemed to
be valid, to met the requirements set forth by H.B. 1305 to retain the
intangible expense deduction.
Once these requirements are met
Pennsylvania would be powerless under the bill to recoup the tax
revenues lost from the transaction. 178
The corporations in Syms and Sherwin-Williams set up intangible
holding companies. 179 Each parent company transferred ownership of
their trademarks to their subsidiaries and then paid a royalty fee to the
subsidiary for the use of the trademark. 80 Recall that the Syms court
found that this transaction had neither economic substance nor a valid
175.

See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 510.

176. Both cases were argued on September 10, 2001 before the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 758; Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 504.
177. Both the Syms court and the Sherwin-Williams court included a discussion that
the royalty payments paid to each IHC were at arms-length rates. See, Syms, 765 N.E.2d
at 765; Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 511. However, because the Syms court deemed
the transaction between Syms and SYL to be a sham, while the Sherwin-Williams court
found the transactions to be valid, it would seem that the mere fact that the IHC charged
the parent corporation a royalty fee at an arms length rate does not remove from or
condemn a transaction to "shamhood." (CITE NEEDED)
178. H.B. 1305 at pt. 2, in. 1-12. The text of the bill allows the Secretary of Revenue
to disregard a transaction only when it is determined that the transaction had as its
principle purpose tax avoidance.
179. Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 760; Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 504.
180. Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 760; Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 508.
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business purpose; therefore, it was a sham which enabled the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to disallow any deductions associated
with the transaction. 181 Additionally, recall that the Sherwin-Williams
court found that the transaction not only had economic substance but that
182
there was also a valid business purpose associated with the transaction.
This determination saved the transaction from being deemed a sham, and
the corporation was able to claim as a valid deduction
the expenses paid
183
to their subsidiaries for the use of the intangibles.
Comparing the structures set up by Syms Corp. and SherwinWilliams, it is easy to see which factors the court found determinative in
its inquires into economic substance and business purpose. Both Syms
and Sherwin-Williams set up IHCs in Delaware and transferred their
intangible property to the IHC subsidiary. 8 4 However, where SYL only
licensed use of the trademarks back to Syms, 185 SWIMC and DIMC

entered into lease agreements with unrelated third parties for the use of
the trademarks. 186 These third party contracts not only had an economic
effect on SWIMC, DIMC, and Sherwin-Williams, but they also lent
credence to the corporation's stated business purposes which SherwinWilliams had claimed as the reason for the formation of the IHCs. 187 The
royalty fees Syms paid to SYL for the use of the trademarks were
transferred back to Syms after only a short holding period, 8 8 whereas
SWIMC and DIMC invested the fees paid to them by Sherwin-Williams
and earned returns greater than those earned by Sherwin-Williams on
comparable investments. 189
Syms's transfer of the trademarks to SYL did not alter Syms's
management of the trademark.' 90 Syms was still responsible for the
defense of the trademark as well as overseeing the quality control of the
trademarks and assignment of the marks to certain products.' 9' In
contrast, after Sherwin-Williams transferred its trademarks to SWIMC
and DIMC, each subsidiary acquired complete control of the
trademark. 192 Each company was responsible for determining the uses of
trademarks, maintaining quality control and defending the trademarks

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 764.
Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 508.
Id.
Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 760; Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 508.
Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 762.
Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 511.
See supra note 130.
Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 762.
Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 511.
Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 762.
Id.
Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 511.
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from lawsuits.193 Sherwin-Williams observed all corporate formalities in
its dealings with SWIMC and DIMC, while Syms treated SYL as an
extension of the already
existing corporation, rather than a viable,
94
independent entity.'
In the final analysis, it appears that courts are likely to find that
those transactions that result in the creation or reorganization of a viable
business entity will not be found to be shams.' 95 For a newly-formed
IHC corporation to be deemed viable, the corporation must be more than
a pass-through for the parent corporation's assets. 196 The subsidiary
should enter into lease agreements, not only with the parent corporation,
but also with unrelated third parties and invest the income earned from
the lease of the intangible property, instead of distributing the income as
a dividend to the parent corporation. The IHC should retain primary
control of the intangible: maintaining quality control of the property,
making decisions about the use of the property and who may lease the
property and assuming responsibility for the protection and defense of
97
the property. 1

What do these distinctions mean for a corporation faced with
defending their transaction against the standard set by H.B. 1305?
Corporations doing business in Pennsylvania seeking to take advantage
of the IHC structure need only to look to these cases and set up their
transactions in a manner similar to those corporations whose transactions
were validated. 98 The corporation then ensures that even if challenged
as being a sham, they can disprove the allegation by showing that the
transaction had substantial business purpose and economic effects. 199
Because corporations can easily develop legitimate ways to act around
the requirements of H.B. 1305, the bill in effect has no teeth. The bill
offers a challenge to the IHC structure; however, the challenge is one
that is not clearly defined and easily circumvented. While H.B. 1305
may initially help Pennsylvania recoup lost corporate income tax
revenue, corporations will begin to learn how to structure their
transaction in a way that prevents the transaction from being deemed a
sham, and H.B. 1305 will be rendered ineffective, throwing Pennsylvania
193.
194.

Id.
Id. at 512.

195. See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 504; Crown Cork and Seal v.
Comptroller of the Treasury, 1999 Md. Tax LEXIS 4 (Md. Tax Ct. 1999); SYL Inc. v.
Comptroller of the Treasury (Md. Tax Ct. 1999).
196. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
197. See Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 516-19.
198. See Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 504; Crown Cork and Seal v. Comptroller
of the Treasury, 1999 Md. Tax LEXIS 4 (Md. Tax Ct. 1999); SYL Inc. v. Comptroller of
the Treasury (Md. Tax Ct. 1999).
199. Sherwin-Williams, 778 N.E.2d at 517-19.

2005]

PENNSYLVANIA'S USE OF THE SHAM TRANSACTION DOCTRINE

1249

back into the quandary that it finds itself in today.
VI. Conclusion
In the era of growing budget deficits, states are becoming desperate
to generate much-needed income. 20 0 Adding to these difficulties is the
steady loss in tax revenue that states are experiencing due to the practices
of many multistate corporations who take advantage of the loopholes
found in state corporate tax statutes to reduce the taxes the corporations
pay to the states. 20 1 One of the more lucrative strategies is the use of
intangible holding companies which allow a corporation to reduce its
state taxable income by transferring use of its intangible property to an
out of state subsidiary and then paying a royalty to the subsidiary for the
use of the property.20 2 Pennsylvania is among the states hardest hit by
these practices, and the state is looking at different ways to combat this
drain on its corporate tax revenues.2 °3 Pennsylvania's strategy has been
to use the federally-created sham transaction doctrine, which allows the
state to disregard any transaction between affiliated corporations that
does not have a substantial business purpose or economic effect, in an
effort to invalidate transactions between corporations and their IHC
subsidiaries. 0 4 Pennsylvania has codified the doctrine in H.B. 1305 in
an attempt to ensure that all transactions entered into by affiliated
corporations, not just those that are challenged in court, conform to the
requirement that the transaction be valid and not entered into solely for
the creation of tax benefits.20 5 By codifying this doctrine, Pennsylvania
would be able to challenge these transactions at an agency level instead
of wasting time and much needed money fighting each transaction in
court.20 6 While H.B. 1305 is a step in the right direction towards closing
the IHC loophole, the bill does not go far enough and, in the end, will
have little effect on Pennsylvania's attempt to recoup lost corporate
income tax revenues. 20 7 As the bill is currently written, only those
corporations who blatantly structure their transactions as vehicles created
solely for the avoidance of state taxes will have their transactions
disregarded, while those corporations who are more subtle about their
purpose and can articulate reasons for the transaction other than the
creation of tax benefits will not be affected. As corporations become
200.
201.
202.
203.

204.
205.
206.
207.

Simpson, supra note 3, at Al.
Mazerov, supra note 4.
Id.
2003 TAX DAY, supra note 5.
H.B. 1305, 2003-2004 Sess., § (3)(t)(3)(B).
Id, pt. 2, In. 1-12.
H.B. 1305, pt. 5, In. 7.
See supra Part V.

1250

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 109:4

increasingly exposed to H.B. 1305 they will learn how to structure their
transactions in a way that places the transaction beyond the grasp of H.B.
1305, and Pennsylvania will find itself in the familiar position of having
to plug a tax loophole that continues to leak a significant amount of its
yearly corporate net income tax dollars.

